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LARGE-SCALE, CAPITAL-INTENSIVE 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE THIRD 
WORLD: CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE 
OVER MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK 
LENDING 
Do not attempt to do us any more good. Your good has done us too much harm 
. already. 
Egyptian Sheik Muhammed Abduh, London, 1884.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Egypt's Aswan High Dam is perhaps the most familiar example 
of a large-scale, capital-intensive Third World2 development project 
gone awry. The benefits promised by the dam were impressive: to 
bring millions of acres of barren or underutilized land under cul-
tivation, to improve farming in the Nile Delta through better drain-
age, to catalyze Egypt's ambitious industrial development plans 
through the generation of inexpensive electricity, to provide flood 
control, and to improve navigation.3 Proponents claimed the eco-
nomic benefits of the Aswan Project would repay its staggering price 
tag in just two years.4 
Tragically, the Aswan High Dam has fallen short of these ex-
pectations.5 For example, the dam failed to improve drainage in 
the Delta, thereby erasing the projected benefits to Delta farming. 6 
In addition, actual electricity generation in any year is limited to a 
1 Quoted in P. T. Bauer & John O'Sullivan, Foreign Aid for What?, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1978, 
at 41. 
2 The terms "Third World" and "developing countries" are used interchangeably 
throughout this Note to refer to nations that tend to receive--rather than contribute--
development aid. These ill-defined expressions, along with "less developed countries" (LDCs) 
and the "North/South" distinction, are used elsewhere to describe a large number of nations 
in terms of GNP, per-capita income, and other dubious criteria. In reality, these nations are 
so diverse that they defy such overbroad categQrization. 
3 JOHN WATERBURY, HYDROPOLITICS OF THE NILE VALLEY 118 (1979). 
'Id. 
5Id. at 118-19; see also RAYMOND F. MIKESELL & LARRY WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL BANKS 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 100 (1992). 
6 See WATERBURY, supra note 3, at 119, 131-34 (discussing how the dam has actually 
aggravated existing drainage problems). 
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maximum of approximately seventy percent of the project's prom-
ised annual capacity and frequently is much lower.7 Moreover, the 
dam continues to unleash a vast array of social, environmental, and 
economic problems on the Egyptian people.8 Coastal erosion threat-
ens the Nile Delta.9 The dam reduces the flow of the Nile, deprives 
valley soils of the sediment that keeps them productive, and harms 
agriculture by increasing soil salinity.lO The project also increases 
river scouring, which endangers bridges and embankments down-
stream and requires expensive remedies. ll Furthermore, soaring 
disease rates accompanied the project's completion. 12 
These problems are not unique to the Aswan Dam Project. 
Large, high-technology development projects generally cost more 
money and cause more ancillary problems than smaller, more lo-
calized projects. 13 That the risks accompanying a grandiose project 
tend to be commensurate with high project expectations is not 
surprising. Unfortunately, because the promoters of large devel-
opment projects, including development banks and government 
agencies, frequently overestimate project benefits and under-
estimate project costs, risks are not fully disclosed and many ill-
fated projects are constructed that objectively should not have 
been built.14 
The multilateral development banks (MDBs or "banks") finance 
a wide variety of development projects in the Third World. Some 
MDB loans are credited with assisting the struggling economies of 
7Id. at 147-49. Typical descriptions of the Aswan project's benefits refer to the dam's 
installed capacity for hydropower production. See id. This figure, however, will never be 
achieved because the water demands of power generation often conflict with those of irrigated 
agriculture, preventing full utilization of the hydroelectric turbines. Id. 
S See generally id. at 119-53. 
9 See infra note 82. 
10 WATERBURY, supra note 3, at 120-34. 
11 Id. at 125-29. 
12 Paul R. Muldoon, The International Law of Ecodevelopment: Emerging Norms for Devel-
opment Assistance Agencies, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1,4 (1987) (describing how schistosomiasis rates 
in the Nile Valley rose to 75% as a result of the Aswan project). 
IS See SUSAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT 156-57 (1988); Fred Pearce,A Watershed 
for the Third World's Irrigators, 114 NEW SCIENTIST 26,26-27 (1987) (addressing the benefits 
of small-scale irrigation in place of problematic large schemes); MIKESELL & WILUAMS, supra 
note 5, at 284-88. 
14 Edward Goldsmith & Nicholas Hildyard, The Politics of Damming, 14 ECOLOGIST 221, 
231 (1984); MIKESELL & WILUAMS, supra note 5, at 75, 80-86, 281 (discussing the flawed 
procedure for assessing costs and benefits that is typically performed for large multilateral 
development bank irrigation and hydroelectric power projects). 
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Third World nations or alleviating local poverty.15 Unfortunately, 
the MDBs have a long record of financing large-scale, capital-inten-
sive development projects that do just the opposite. Many of these 
projects have harmed the host country's economy and caused social 
and environmental chaos along the way.16 
The U.S. Congress has some influence over the MDBs and has 
used this influence to alter bank lending policies in the pastY Con-
gress, however, has not succeeded in convincing the MDBs to aban-
don their destructive large-scale lending practices. Congress has 
legislation in place that attempts, unsuccessfully, to influence the 
banks to adopt lending policies that are more beneficial to the 
people of the borrower nations. 18 To playa more effective role, 
however, Congress must begin to use its power of the purse to link 
U.S. MDB contributions to MDB compliance with this legislation. 
This Note examines the problems associated with large-scale, 
capital-intensive MDB development projects in the Third World 
and analyzes the shortcomings of current U.S. legislation aimed at 
addressing these problems. Part II presents an overview of MDB 
structure and MDB policy regarding project size and nature. Part 
III analyzes the costs and benefits of large, capital-intensive devel-
opment projects. Examples are offered showing how MDBs com-
monly misrepresent large project costs and benefits, making such 
projects risky alternatives for an already debt-burdened country. 
Part IV presents examples of small-scale development alter-
natives that have succeeded in the developing world. Part V ex-
amines the role that Congress plays in establishing U.S. policy to-
ward MDB development projects. Finally, Part VI assesses the 
effectiveness of U.S. policy initiatives and proposes specific mea-
sures that would encourage the MDBs to adopt more progressive 
development standards. 
15 See, e.g., MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 287-88 (providing examples of suc-
cessful small-scale MDB loans in Latin America). 
16 Anne McIlroy, Financing International Debacles, OTTAWA CITIZEN, March 8, 1992, at El, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Ottawa File. "Since the '70s, the [World] Bank has spent 
billions on projects that have turned into environmental, social, and fiscal catastrophes, 
leaving Third World countries deeply in debt with little to show for it." Id. 
17 See JONATHAN E. SANFORD, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT 
BANKS 12-14 (1982). 
18 Congress recognizes the severe impact that many projects have had on the developing 
world, and has criticized the MDBs from time to time. In 1986, for example, the Senate 
Appropriations Committee asserted that "recent incidences of drought and famine, conta-
gious disease and economic decline have been made worse rather than better by certain bank 
loans." S. REP. No. 443, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1986). 
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II. THE STRUCTURE AND POLICY OF THE MULTILATERAL 
DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
A. Multilateral Development Bank Organization 
The multilateral development banks were organized for the 
purpose of financing development in the less-developed countries. 19 
There are four major MDBs: the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (World Bank), the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the African 
Development Bank.20 The MDBs fund development schemes 
through "hard" loans made at near-market interest rates, as well as 
"soft" (concessional) loans, which carry low interest or are interest-
free. 21 Typically, hard loans are financed by money borrowed on 
the international capital market, while soft loans are financed pri-
marily through contributions from the developed countries.22 
The MDBs are independent, autonomous institutions that are 
under the stewardship of a president who does not represent any 
particular member country.23 Each bank has a board of executive 
directors that is responsible for supervising bank operations and 
approving bank loans.24 Member countries each appoint a repre-
sentative who is vested with voting power in proportion to that 
nation's financial contributions and subscription to capital stock.25 
At the World Bank, these representatives, in turn, delegate power 
to the twelve executive directors, five of whom must represent the 
19 SANFORD, supra note 17, at 3; see aim, e.g., Articles of Agreement of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, art. I (i), T.I.A.S. No. 1503, 2 
U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter World Bank Articles of Agreement] (article I establishes the 
purpose of the World Bank). The largest and oldest MDB, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), initially targeted much of its aid to econ-
omies disrupted by World War II. See id. 
20 SANFORD, s¥pra note 17, at 3. In July 1945, the Bretton Woods Conference established 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in response to the international 
economic reorganization efforts that followed World War II. The three regional development 
banks were organized in the 1960s and have the same general structure and policies as the 
World Bank. See id. at 3-8, 14. 
21 [d. at 7. The World Bank has two affiliates: the International Finance Corporation 
and the International Development Association. The latter operates primarily out of the 
Bank's soft loan window. [d. 
22 [d . 
• , [d. at 8; see also, e.g., World Bank Articles of Agreement, supra note 19, art. V, § 5 (c) . 
•• SANFORD, supra note 17, at 8; see also, e.g., World Bank Articles of Agreement, supra 
note 19, art. V, § 4 . 
.. SANFORD, supra note 17, at 8; see also, e.g., World Bank Articles of Agreement, supra 
note 19, art. V, §§ 2, 3. 
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bank's five largest shareholders.26 Thus, because the United States 
has the largest or second largest voting share at each of the four 
MDBs, the potential for U.S. influence over bank policy is signifi-
cant.27 
B. MDB Development Philosophy 
The MDBs generally pursue conservative development policies, 
using criteria such as creditworthiness and rates of economic return 
on capital to evaluate loan proposals.28 Traditionally, the banks have 
sought short-term economic growth through capital formation ac-
tivities,29 and have placed great emphasis on large-scale, capital-
intensive development projects such as hydroelectric dams, exten-
sive agricultural schemes, and other infrastructure projects.30 
This kind of big-ticket lending is commonplace. For example, 
the planning and implementation ofthe World Bank-financed Volta 
River hydroelectric project in Ghana spanned three decades.31 
Other examples include the Polonoroeste road construction and 
resettlement scheme in Brazil, which was projected to cost $1.6 
billion,32 and the multibillion dollar Indonesian "Transmigrasi" pro-
gram, which initially planned to resettle approximately seventy mil-
lion people within the country.33 
Over the past two decades, the MDBs have focused increasingly 
on the direct alleviation of poverty.34 This shift in lending policy is 
primarily attributable to the rejection of "trickle-down" theories of 
.6 World Bank Articles of Agreement, supra note 19, art. V, § 4 (b); Todd K. Marten, 
Ending Tropical Deforestation: What is the Proper Role for the World Bank?, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REv. 485, 490 (1989) . 
• 7 Bruce M. Rich, The Multilateral Development Banks, Environmental Policy, and the United 
States, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 681, 718-19 & nn.254 & 257 (1985). Although there is no formal 
veto power at the banks, the U.S. vote is large enough (35%) to block action at the Inter-
American Development Bank's Fund for Special Operations, where a two-thirds vote is 
required for project approval. [d . 
• 8 SANFORD, supra note 17, at 7; Marten, supra note 26, at 491. 
.9 See Muldoon, supra note 12, at 2-5. 
so See, e.g., Rich, supra note 27, at 688; Muldoon, supra note 12, at 2, 9. 
31 See DAVID HART, THE VOLTA RIVER PROJECT: A CASE STUDY IN POLITICS AND TECH-
NOLOGY 21-32 (1980). 
3. Rich, supra note 27, at 694. 
33 Marcus Colchester, Banking on Disaster: International Support for Transmigration, 16 
ECOLOGIST 61, 61 (1986). The Transmigrasi program has accounted for as much as six 
percent of Indonesia's national spending. Id. at 63. 
S4 SANFORD, supra note 17, at 192, 199. 
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Third World economic development.35 Nevertheless, the MDBs 
continue to favor large-scale, capital-intensive projects over smaller, 
more appropriate projects.36 
In the 1980s, as a result of social, environmental, and economic 
problems caused by many of these large projects, the MDBs became 
the targets of much criticism from people concerned about envi-
ronmental or developmental affairsY In short, many large MDB-
financed projects were not only failing to improve conditions in the 
host country, they were destroying the country's resources in the 
process. Led by the World Bank, the MDBs began to focus more 
attention on the consequences of their development projects.38 
In 1989, the President of the World Bank, Barber B. Conable, 
announced what appeared to be a major change in World Bank 
development policy.39 The World Bank seemed ready to acknowl-
edge the need for projects to be designed around the concept of 
sustainable development-a concept that seeks to preserve existing 
economic capabilities.40 The World Commission on Environment 
and Development defines sustainable development as "development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs."41 
Conable stated that the Bank had increased lending in areas 
that are presumably geared towards sustainable development, such 
as forestry and population programs.42 Moreover, Conable explicitly 
recognized the relationship between reducing poverty in the short 
35 ROBERT L. AYRES, BANKING ON THE POOR 7-8 (1983); SANFORD, supra note 17, at 192. 
For an early discussion of the failures of "trickle down" development theory, see generally 
James P. Grant, Development: The End of Trickle Down?, FOREIGN POL'y, Fall 1973, at 43. 
36 See, e.g., Bruce M. Rich, The Greening of the Development Banks: Rhetoric and Reality, 19 
ECOLOGIST 44,44-45 (1989) (describing the Carajas iron ore project in Brazil); MIKESELL & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 286-87. 
37 See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 13, at 155-68. 
38 See Bruce M. Rich, Do World Bank Loans Yield Deforested Zones?, Bus. & SOC'Y REv., Fall 
1990, at 10. In 1987, the World Bank adopted a series of environmental reforms designed 
to focus more attention on project side-effects. Rich argues that these reforms have not 
improved decision-making at the Bank. Id. at 14. But see Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Multilateral 
Development Banks, Environmental Diseconomies, and International Reform Pressures on the Lending 
Process: The Example of Third World Dam-Building Projects, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 169,204 
(1989) (environmental reform at the World Bank "appears to have led to practical results"). 
39 Barber B. Conable, Development and the Environment: A Global Balance, Address 
Before the Tokyo Conference on the Global Environment and Human Response Toward 
Sustainable Development (Sept. 11, 1989), in 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 235 (1990). 
40 I d. passim. 
41 WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 
(1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]. 
42 Conable, supra note 39, at 245. 
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term and protecting the environment and the resources that are 
necessary for long-term development.43 Nevertheless, the World 
Bank apparently is not yet fully committed to serving the long-term 
interests of the Third World people, or to the concept of sustainable 
development.44 
Comments in a confidential memorandum authored by the 
World Bank's chief economist, Lawrence Summers,45 and leaked in 
February 1992, confirm that some shortsighted development poli-
cymakers still exist at that institution. In this memorandum, Sum-
mers argued that the Bank should encourage less developed na-
tions, with their relatively clean environments, low wages, low living 
standards, and short life expectancies, to develop "dirty" industries 
because, in effect, the poor cannot afford to develop safely or 
.efficiently.46 Industries that affect air quality or pollute irrigation 
supplies, however, do not contribute to overall development if, as a 
result, workers become ill or crop yields fall. Unfortunately, al-
though the World Bank apologized for Summers' comments,47 the 
MDBs continue to approve enormous capital-intensive loans in the 
energy and agriculture sectors for projects that, like dirty industries, 
may be economically detrimental to the developing world.48 
Regardless of policy statements, the MDBs may be institution-
ally and procedurally predisposed towards large-scale, capital-inten-
sive projects.49 Commentators criticize the World Bank for striving 
45 [d. at 235-37. Many of the Bank's early detractors were environmentalists who were 
concerned about the severe environmental impacts of many MDB projects. A recent addition 
to this criticism is the realization that social and economic harms, especially those dispropor-
tionately affecting the poor and underrepresented, often accompany such environmental 
impacts. See, e.g., MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 89-91. It was not until 1992, however, 
that the World Bank began to realize that many existing projects are unjustifiable even on 
purely economic terms. Mark Abley, Bank Takes on Green Tinge, CALGARY HERALD, May 17, 
1992, at AI0, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Calher File. 
44 See, e.g., Rich, supra note 38, at 13-14. 
45 Memorandum from Lawrence H. Summers, World Bank Chief Economist (Dec. 12, 
1991) (on file with the Boston College Third World Law Journal). 
46 [d. at 5. Summers remarked that "the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic 
waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable." [d. This "logic" fails to recognize that people 
must rely on their local economy no matter how "underdeveloped" or "low-wage" it may be. 
Furthermore, Summers' argument implies that human discomfort, suffering, and death 
caused by severe pollution is somehow more tolerable in the Third World than in developed 
nations. This is particularly disturbing in light of the Third World's lack of adequate health 
care facilities. 
47 Michael Prowse, Save Planet Earth From Economists, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1992, at 26. 
48 See, e.g., Mark Abley, Breaking the Bank, O'ITAWA CITIZEN, April 5, 1992, at B6, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Ottawa File; Rich, supra note 38, at 13-14. 
49 PHILIPPE LEPRESTRE, THE WORLD BANK AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE 66 
(1989); MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 287; see also Rich, supra note 27, at 742. 
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to reach annual lending targets so that it can be in a position to 
request a higher budget for the following year. 50 This practice cre-
ates an incentive for Bank employees to make loans for large-scale, 
capital-intensive projects with higher price tags, rather than low-
technology, less expensive alternatives that may be more appropri-
ate. 51 By favoring big-ticket projects, World Bank staff can use their 
time more economically52 while serving the Bank's ultimate imper-
ative-namely, to keep the funds moving. 53 
Historically, large, capital-intensive projects have not fared well 
in the Third World.54 Costly schemes not only place the host country 
at greater risk should the project falter, but also overwhelm the 
borrower with debt. 55 Quite frequently, the proposals for these 
projects contain very little information about long-term effects or 
externalities that would result from project implementation.56 When 
project engineers or MDB staff prepare cost-benefit analyses, they 
are often seriously flawed or incomplete.57 The failure of these 
analyses to include or accurately assess project costs other than 
initial monetary outlays-for example, increased rates of disease-
often makes a disastrously diseconomic project appear desirable.58 
Although MDB c~itics have long recognized the magnitude of this 
problem, it was only recently that the World Bank reluctantly dis-
closed its own findings on the issue. A confidential internal review 
leaked by the World Bank in September 1992, reveals that an as-
tounding 37.5% of development projects evaluated in 1991 were 
failures, a marked increase from the 15% failure rate ten years 
earlier. 59 The following section discusses two particularly trouble-
50 See, e.g., STEPHEN HELLINGER ET AL., AID FOR JUST DEVEWPMENT 126-27 (1988); 
MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 287; SUSAN GEORGE, ILL FARES THE LAND 36 (1984). 
51 LEPRESTRE, supra note 49, at 66; see also HELLINGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 125-27. 
52 MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 287; LEPRESTRE, supra note 49, at 66; see also 
Rich, supra note 27, at 742. 
5! LEPRESTRE, supra note 49, at 66; see also Rich, supra note 38, at 14. Rich also argues 
that this imperative ultimately makes the Bank dependent on its larger borrowers, thereby 
compromising the Bank's autonomy. See id. 
54 E.g., MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 284-85; see also, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 
13, at 156. 
55 See GEORGE, supra note 13, at 156. In fact, developing countries actually paid the World 
Bank more money than they received in a recent fiscal year. Abley, supra note 48, at B6. 
58. 
21. 
56 MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 50-52; see, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 13, at 156-
57 MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 281-84; LEPRESTRE, supra note 49, at 17,19. 
58 MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 281; see also LEPRESTRE, supra note 49, at 19-
59 World Bank Portfolio Management Task Force, Effective Implementation: Key to 
Development Impact ii (July 24, 1992) (confidential discussion draft, on file with the Boston 
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some kinds of large-scale MDB lending-agriculture modernization 
schemes and hydroelectric projects-and analyzes why such projects 
often impede, rather than promote, Third World development. 
III. THE ADVERSE IMPACTS OF LARGE-SCALE, CAPITAL-INTENSIVE 
MDB PROJECTS ON THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
Traditional Third World development schemes have focused 
on the introduction of large-scale, capital-intensive projects, such as 
hydroelectric dams, to the developing country.60 This strategy is 
based on two assumptions: first, that Third World development is 
best realized through rapid expansion of industry and infrastruc-
ture and promotion of modernized agriculture; and second, that 
the benefits of this process will "trickle down" to the vast majority 
of citizens who must watch from the sidelines.6l Neither of these 
assumptions, however, has proven reliable.62 
A. Failure of Large-Scale, Capital-Intensive Projects to Benefit the 
General Population: Agricultural Modernization 
When the purported benefits of a large-scale MDB project 
outweigh its costs, the beneficiaries are often the few who already 
hold significant land or capital; the bulk of the population usually 
does not participate.63 Ironically, poverty exists in many MDB mem-
ber states as well as in the developing world. 64 Yet, instead of in-
creasing funding for domestic social and poverty alleviation pro-
grams, member states choose to make MDB contributions that may 
ultimately finance these misdirected development projects. As a 
result, development aid that does not directly benefit the neediest 
College Third World Law Journal). This internal review, headed by then World Bank vice-
president Willi Wapenhans, is known as the Wapenhans Report. The report cites several 
reasons for the high failure rate including poor project design, management, and imple-
mentation. [d. at ii-iii. Significantly, among the major institution-wide changes urged by the 
report is the replacement of the Bank's emphasis on disbursing funds and promoting projects, 
with a new focus on actual sustainable development impact. [d. at 24-29. 
60 Muldoon, supra note 12, at 2, 9. 
61/d. at 9. 
62 SANFORD, supra note 17, at 192-99; AYRES, supra note 35, at 8; GEORGE, supra note 50, 
at 9-10; PAUL STREETEN ET AL., FIRST THINGS FIRST: MEETING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 8-11 (1981). 
63 See Bruce Rich, The Emperor's New Clothes: The World Bank and Environmental Reform, 
7 WORLD POL'y J. 305, 320-21 (1989); GEORGE, supra note 50, at 11-12; Mark Fineman, A 
Scheme to Harness India's Sacred Waters Brings Tempers to a Boil, 21 SMITHSONIAN 118, 128-32 
(Nov. 1990). 
64 See Bauer & O'Sullivan, supra note 1, at 43. 
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Third World inhabitants is criticized because it merely "takes money 
from the poor in rich countries and gives it to the rich in poor 
countries. "65 
For example, in the context of a typical agricultural modern-
ization scheme, the debtor government encourages wealthy farmers 
or corporations to buy up rich farmland for large-scale, mechanized 
cultivation that requires expensive fertilizers and pesticides.66 To 
repay the massive loans that financed the scheme, the soil must be 
converted from staple crops to more profitable cash crops for export 
to the developed world.67 Most of the profit, however, remains in 
the developed nations-in the hands of shipping and processing 
companies-while the fraction claimed by the developing state ac-
crues to the wealthy farmer or corporation.68 As a result, very little 
real development occurs because the Third World nation is com-
pelled by its debt burden to substitute exportable cash crops for 
consumable food production.69 Brazil illustrates this vicious circle 
as forty-two percent of its 1982 export earnings was used to service 
its debt.70 
Furthermore, the switch to mechanized, labor-saving technol-
ogy takes the common farmer off the land and creates few, if any, 
jobs in the process.71 Many developed nations have a vast amount 
of arable land but relatively few farmers to cultivate it. Thus, these 
countries rely upon capital-intensive, "modern" agricultural tech-
niques that emphasize yield per person.72 Conversely, most devel-
oping nations have relatively small amounts of arable land but large 
rural populations. Therefore, developing nations are better off em-
phasizing yield per unit of land by utilizing the available labor.73 In 
this scenario, "modern" agriculture is not only less valuable, but 
also leaves the rural poor unemployed.74 This is precisely what has 
65ld.; see also AYRES, supra note 35, at 237. 
66 See Tropical Forest Development Projects-Status of Environmental and Agricultural Research: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research, and Environment of the 
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1984) (testimony of Brazilian 
agronomist Jose Lutzenberger). 
67 See Rich, supra note 27, at 689, 743; GEORGE, supra note 50, at 10. 
68 GEORGE, supra note 50, at 10. 
69 See id.; Rich, supra note 27, at 743. 
70 Rich, supra note 27, at 743. 
7. GEORGE, supra note 50, at II; see also STREETEN ET AL., supra note 62, at 8-17 (discussing 
problems with traditional assumptions about the labor-development relationship in the con-
text of meeting basic human needs). 
72 GEORGE, supra note 50, at II. 
"See id. at 11-12. 
7°ld. at 10-12, 50-51. 
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happened in Latin America where, as early as 1972, mechanization 
had eliminated 2.5 million agricultural jobs, according to a con-
servative United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
estimate. 75 
Those MDB officials who support the theory that the road to 
development is through large-scale, capital-intensive projects em-
phasize such benefits as inexpensive, abundant electricity from en-
ergy projects and tremendous gains in acreage under cultivation or 
per-farmer yield that can be realized from agricultural projects. 
These achievements are less desirable in most of the developing 
world, however, especially where poverty is pervasive and rural 
labor is plentiful. 76 Therefore, consideration must be given to how 
appropriate a proposed development scheme is in a particular 
setting. 
CrItics of large, capital-intensive projects, including many in-
dividuals and organizations concerned about alleviating poverty and 
environmental pressures, do not advocate its replacement by a pro-
gram of unadulterated welfare that would sacrifice all economic 
growth.77 Nor do they argue that all modern technology is inappro-
priate. 78 Rather, they claim that more emphasis should be placed 
on localized, scaled-down projects that are inherently less risky and 
appropriate technologies that are more easily maintained in a Third 
World environment. 79 
Significantly, in addition to the inability of many large-scale 
projects to benefit the general population as discussed above, the 
reliance on massive, expensive, high-technology projects has largely 
failed for another reason. In the race to fund the biggest or most 
modern project, the MDBs have approved schemes with faulty, 
insufficient, or non-existent cost-benefit analyses.8o Many of these 
large-scale projects have proven to be monumental disasters.8l The 
following subsection examines a second kind of popular, large-scale 
75 K.C. Abercrombie, Agricultural Mechanisation and Employment in Latin America, 106INT'L 
LAB. REV. 11,29 (1972) (K.C. Abercrombie was the director of the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization/Economic Commission for Latin America Joint Agriculture Divi-
sion); see also GEORGE, supra note 50, at 29-30. 
76 See GEORGE, supra note 50, at 50-51. 
77 See STREETEN ET AL., supra note 62, at 4,96-108. 
78 See GEORGE, supra note 13, at 156. 
79 MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 284-88; see aLw OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra 
note 41, at 77-78. 
80 See Plater, supra note 38, at 176-77; MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 281-84; 
GEORGE, supra note 13, at 156. 
81 See GEORGE, supra note 13, at 155-56. 
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MDB project that typically has done more economic harm than 
good in the Third World. 
B. Economic Risks of Large-Scale, Capital-Intensive MDB Projects: 
Hydroelectric Schemes 
Large-scale, capital-intensive projects funded by the MDBs 
have left a legacy of economic destruction in the Third World. 
Hydroelectric projects, which have been among the most popular 
big-ticket development programs at the banks, provide a stark ex-
ample of the risks associated with large-scale project lending in the 
Third World.82 
The MDBs have funded the construction of numerous dam-
building projects in the developing world.83 These projects have 
advertised significant benefits to the host country, including ample 
supplies of inexpensive electric power, improved navigation, flood 
control, and a regulated source of water for irrigation, industry, 
and drinking supplies.84 Although those who design, build, and 
fund dams have had some success at predicting project benefits at 
start-up, their inability to foresee attendant reductions in these 
benefits once the dam is operational and their failure to adequately 
assess project costs are alarming.85 
To begin with, the actual financial costs of hydroelectric projects 
typically exceed the initial budget. 86 As a result, cost overruns ren-
der cost-benefit analyses suspect even before the dam has been 
completed or the first megawatt has been produced.87 More impor-
"2 See LEPRESTRE, supra note 49, at 20-21 (briefly describing the World Bank's realization 
of the problems associated with inappropriate Third World development projects, especially 
large dams). Current research is uncovering additional long-term effects associated with 
these projects. For example, Egypt stands to lose hundreds of square miles of land to the 
Mediterranean by the year 2100 because Nile River sediments, which historically have re-
plenished soil lost to the sea, are now trapped behind the infamous Aswan Dam. Will the Nile 
Delta Sink Into the Sea?, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 1992 (Geographica section). 
83 See, e.g., Rich, supra note 36, at 47-50 (India'S Narmada Valley project); NaynaJhaveri, 
The Three Gorges Debacle, 18 ECOLOGIST 56, 56 (1988) (the Three Gorges project on the 
Yangtze River); Rich, supra note 27, at 701-02 & nn.142-45. 
84 E.g., WATERBURY, supra note 3, at 118; Jhaveri, supra note 83, at 56. 
85 For a more detailed examination of the unanticipated environmental costs that are 
often associated with hydroelectric dams, see Plater, supra note 38, at 176-89. Although these 
costs are categorized as "environmental" costs, many are also economic costs that have 
significant effects on the host country's ability to develop. See generally EDWARD GOLDSMITH 
& NICHOLAS HILDYARD, THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF LARGE DAMS (1984). 
86 See Plater, supra note 38, at 177. 
87 McIlroy, supra note 16, at El (noting that the $11 billion Narmada project under 
construction in India was over budget in the first stage). 
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tantly, these projects often create more devastating economic costs 
that rarely are accounted for in cost-benefit analyses.88 
For example, many Third World dam projects provide water 
for intensive irrigation schemes that enable farmers to take full 
advantage of the soil by growing more water-dependent crops and 
by planting more often.89 River water contains traces of salts that 
are leached naturally from the rocks and soils of the river basin.90 
When farmers employ modern, intensive irrigation techniques, es-
pecially in the hot climates typical of the Third World, the river 
water cycles through the soil much more often than before, causing 
salts to accumulate in the soil through evaporation.9l In addition, 
the salinization process is aggravated when soils become water-
logged through year-round, intensive irrigation.92 Salinization has 
ruined some of the Third World's most productive soils which, 
absent the dam and its constant irrigation supply, would have made 
economic contributions,93 Thus, hydroelectric project cost-benefit 
analyses must account for this cost. 
Most dams are built upstream of productive farmlands, which 
are heavily dependent on the river valley's rich, alluvial soil that has 
been laid down during seasonal floods over the years.94 After com-
pletion of the dam, however, the nutrient-rich suspended sediments 
previously deposited on the valley floor become trapped in the 
reservoir,95 In addition, the dam regulates the river's flow, thereby 
eliminating the seasonal floods that delivered the nutrients to the 
valley soils.96 The disruption of the flooding cycle results in down-
stream farmland becoming progressively less productive with time, 
yet MDB cost-benefit analyses do not include this economic COSt. 97 
Many hydroelectric dams also harm productive fisheries that 
depend on the river's rich nutrients.gil These fisheries may be 10-
HH See, e.g., LEPRESTRE, supra note 49, at 20; MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 281-
84. 
H'I See, e.g., WATERBURY, supra note 3, at 118 (listing perennial irrigation as a benefit of 
the Aswan High Dam). 
90 Briefing Document: The Social and Environmental t1fects of Large Dams, 14 ECOLOGIST 1, 
11 (1984) [hereinafter Briefing Document]. 
91 Plater, supra note 38, at 183. 
92 Briefing Document, supra note 90, at 11. 
93 See Muldoon, supra note 12, at 4; Plater, supra note 38, at 183. 
94 See, e.g., WATERBURY, supra note 3, at 129-31. 
95 [d. 
96 Plater, supra note 38, at 181-82. 
97 GEORGE, supra note 13, at 156. 
9" Briefing Document, supra note 90, at 6-7. For an interesting counter-example, see HART, 
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cated near the river's mouth, in the delta, or throughout the down-
stream reaches and can be decimated if the river's flow decreases, 
allowing saltwater intrusion into the lower reaches, or if nutrients 
are trapped behind a dam.99 Other changes in water quality pro-
duced by dams can result in fish kills as well. lOo 
Riverborne disease is yet another economic side-effect of many 
large dam projects. When a river is impounded or used for irriga-
tion, large areas of still water form and create ideal conditions for 
the spread of diseases such as schistosomiasis, malaria, and oncho-
cerciasis (river blindness).101 It is not uncommon for these diseases 
to afflict three-fourths of the population in the project area.102 As 
a result, the cost of providing health care to the sick and the related 
costs associated with reduced worker productivity must be included 
in cost-benefit analyses. 103 For example, even during the early years 
of Egypt's Aswan Dam Project, when the schistosomiasis infection 
rate was still as low as forty percent, annual lost productivity costs 
associated with the disease already consumed more than one-third 
of the dam's overinflated projected economic benefits. 104 
Dams can result in numerous other costs in the form of lost 
economic opportunities. For example, countries can lose potential 
or existing revenue sources when mineral deposits, productive soils, 
or popular tourist attractions such as archaeological treasures are 
inundated by a reservoir. 105 To make matters worse, many large 
dams have caused serious social displacement problems that can 
exacerbate the project's negative economic effects. 106 
supra note 31, at 88-89, describing how Ghana's Akosombo Dam destroyed small fisheries 
downstream but created a more successful fishing industry in its reservoir. 
99 Jhaveri, supra note 83, at 59-60. 
100 See, e.g., Nicholas Hildyard, Adios Amazonia? A Report From the Altimira Gathering, 19 
ECOLOGIST 53, 55 (1989) (reservoir drowned uncleared forest leading to eutrophication); 
Plater, supra note 38, at 181 (changes in downstream temperature; increases in downstream 
nitrogen levels). . 
101 HART, supra note 31, at 90-94; Muldoon, supra note 12, at 4; Jhaveri, supra note 83, 
at 60-61; Rich, supra note 27, at 702. 
102 HART, supra note 31, at 90-95 (after the Volta River was dammed, typical infection 
rates rose to 75% for onchocerciasis and 80% for schistosomiasis); Muldoon, supra note 12, 
at 4 (schistosomiasis infection rale in Egypt rose from 21 % to 75% following completion of 
the Aswan Dam). 
103 Lost productivity costs alone are estimated to have approached $7 million per year 
(1975 dollars) near Ghana's Volta River Project. HART, supra note 31, at 97. 
104 See WATERBURY, supra note 3, at 118, 146. 
105 See Plater, supra note 38, at 184-85. 
106 See, e.g., James C.N. Paul, International Development Agencies, Human Rights, and Humane 
Development Projects, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 67, 91-95 (1988). Large dams often require 
the resettlement of entire villages and can displace millions of people. See Philip M. Fearnside, 
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Many hydroelectric dam proposals misrepresent project bene-
fits as well.107 The useful life of a dam is usually determined by how 
long it takes sediments that are carried by the river to fill up the 
reservoir, thereby eliminating the project's storage capacity. lOB Un-
fortunately, forecasting project life from historic sedimentation 
rates is problematic,109 and if the rate of sedimentation is underes-
timated, the anticipated useful life of the dam will be misleadingly 
high. llo This problem is compounded where dams have attracted 
new activities that accelerate erosion, such as logging or farming, 
upstream from the project site. lll In addition, project planners have 
misrepresented the value of irrigation schemes associated with dams 
by overestimating the amount or the quality of arable land in the 
project area. 1l2 
Furthermore, if the area flooded by the dam's reservoir is 
composed of porous material, the river will lose much of its dis-
charge through seepage. ll3 In hot climates, river discharge is sig-
nificantly reduced through evaporation as well, because the reser-
voir has substantially increased the surface area of the river 
system. 114 If flow is reduced, the benefits from electricity produc-
tion, improved navigation, and increased irrigation, industrial, and 
drinking water supplies will be lower than projected. 115 
Finally, large-scale, capital-intensive hydroelectric projects are 
even less desirable when their benefits accrue to only a small seg-
Resettlement Plans for China's Three Gorges Dam, in DAMMING THE THREE GORGES: WHAT DAM-
BUILDERS DON'T WANT You To KNOW 36 (Grainne Ryder, ed. (for Probe International) 1990) 
(Three Gorges project would displace as many as 1,200,000 people). The feelings of indig-
enous people rarely are considered and the resettlement programs promised by development 
agencies or local governments frequently fail, leaving the displaced people in poverty. See id. 
at 46,50-55; HART, supra note 31, at 87-88; Briefing Document, supra note 90, at 2-3. 
107 LEPRESTRE, supra note 49, at 20. 
108 Plater, supra note 38, at 186-87. 
109 See id. 
1I0 MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 75. It is not uncommon to see a dam's storage 
capacity, and hence its useful life, fall short of engineers' predictions because the rate of 
sedimentation was underestimated, especially in the tropics. Briefing Document, supra note 90, 
at 16. The capacity of Colombia's Anchicaya Dam decreased by 80% in just 20 years, owing 
to sedimentation. LEPRESTRE, supra note 49, at 20. An even more distressing example is 
China's useless Laoying Reservoir, which filled with sediment before the dam was finished. 
Briefing Document, supra note 90, at 16. 
III See Jhaveri, supra note 83, at 58. 
1I2 See Plater, supra note 38, at 183. 
113 See Goldsmith & Hildyard, supra note 14, at 226. 
1I4 See id. 
liS See WATERBURY, supra note 3, at 118-22. Reduced river flow also can increase project 
costs by having serious consequences on all pre-project economic uses of the river downstream 
from the dam. See generally Jhaveri, supra note 83. 
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ment of the population, as discussed above in the context of agri-
cultural modernization schemes. The MDBs funded the construc-
tion of many large dams to satisfy the electricity demands of foreign 
entities or the domestic industrial elite. 116 A case in point is Ghana's 
Volta River Project, which received World Bank financing. 117 For-
eigners, principally the United States government and the Kaiser 
Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, promoted this hydroelectric 
station. IIB Their respective goals were to gain political influence in 
the fledgling African nations and to procure a large source of cheap 
electricity for an aluminum plant. llg The Ghanaian leader, Kwame 
Nkrumah, adopted the project in the belief that electrification 
would help Ghana develop and industrialize. 120 
The anticipated domestic industrialization, however, did not 
occur. 121 Other expected benefits, including irrigation and lake 
transport schemes, have not fully materialized, in part because they 
were inappropriate to begin with.122 In addition, soaring disease 
rates l23 and an expensive and largely unsuccessful resettlement 
scheme for the 80,000 villagers displaced by the dam have added 
to project costs. 124 In fact, the Ghanaian people have borne the costs 
of the Volta project while receiving very little, if any, benefit. 125 
Conversely, cheap electricity has made the project a success for the 
U.S. government and Kaiser Aluminum. 126 
Thus, large dams represent huge capital and technological in-
vestments. 127 The problems described above make dams an ex-
tremely risky path to development for the Third World. If donor 
governments required the MDBs to generate comprehensive cost-
116 Edward Goldsmith & Nicholas Hildyard, The Myth of the Benign Superdam, 14 ECOLO-
GIST 217, 217-18 (1984). 
117 See generally HART, supra note 31. Although the World Bank supported the dam and 
provided a $47 million loan at project start-up, Hart argues that Bank involvement at least 
helped Ghana to secure more favorable terms-for example, the price of electricity. !d. at 
49-50,54. 
118 See id. at 103-06. 
119Id. at 103. 
12°Id. 
121 Id. at 104. 
122 /d. at 99-10 1. 
12:' Sel' supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text. 
124 HART, supra note 31, at 87-88. 104. 
125 See id. at 103-06. 
126 See iii. at 103. 
127 Cost estimates for the mammoth World Bank-supported Three Gorges Dam in China 
range from $4 billion to $16 billion. See Jhaveri, supra note 83. at 56. For the Tucurui Dam 
in Brazil. construction costs alone are expected to reach $8 billion. GEORGE, supra note 13, 
at 156. 
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benefit analyses for these projects-analyses that accounted for all 
social, environmental, and long-term economic effects-developing 
countries would gain a better understanding of their development 
alternatives and the attendant economic risks. Many existing dams 
have a negative net impact on their region'S economy and rationally 
would not have been built if their costs and benefits had been 
accurately assessed. 128 
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF SMALL-SCALE, LIGHT-CAPITAL 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
Quite frequently, the most appropriate development schemes 
for Third World countries are relatively small-scale and more labor-
intensive. Although every nation needs energy and most seek to 
improve agricultural output, large-scale hydroelectric dams are not 
often the answer to these needs. In some cases, several small dams 
that account for specific local needs would be more appropriate. 129 
In addition, smaller projects frequently can involve and benefit 
the general population in a way that many of the banks' large-scale, 
capital-intensive projects have not. The more expensive and tech-
nologically advanced an agricultural project is, for example, the less 
likely it is to allow for participation from common farmers. 13o Un-
fortunately, even where ample evidence demonstrates that the gen-
eral population would benefit more from a smaller, lower-technol-
ogy project, internal pressures within the banks, as discussed above, 
may still favor larger schemes. 131 
A World Bank-financed development project illustrates this 
bias: 
Comparative cost/income calculations showed in 1974, for ex-
ample, that for oil palm development schemes in Nigeria, if 
"based on village processing units, growers' family incomes 
would be approximately 50 percent higher and over-all invest-
ment in transport and processing facilities 75 percent lower than 
in a large-scale industrial scheme." The World Bank nonetheless 
made loans in 1975 and 1978 totaling $95 million-for large-
scale, centralized industrial oil palm development in Nigeria. 132 
128 See Plater, supra note 38, at 189. 
129 See GEORGE, supra note 13, at 156. 
"0 See GEORGE, supra note 50, at 10-12,50-51. 
m [d. at 35-36. 
ISO [d. at 36 (quoting E. Reusse, Economic and Marketing Aspects of Post-Haroest Systems in 
Small Farmer Economies, 25 FAO MONTHLY BULLETIN OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AND 
STATISTICS, Sept. 1976). 
362 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:345 
Smaller-scale agricultural schemes not only reach the common 
farmers more easily, but also avoid the soil degradation typically 
associated with intensive modern irrigation projects. An interesting 
example that furthers both of these objectives is a traditional Mayan 
agro-forestry system that simply consists of "raised fields built of 
organic material and mud and separated by irrigation channels."133 
Such methods are labor-intensive and beneficial to the soil, and 
tend to be quite productive. 134 
Although the poor quality tropical soils that exist in many 
developing nations cannot support any form of modern farming, 
the banks have not given much consideration to more traditional 
schemes like the Mayan example discussed above. 135 As a result, 
many MDB-financed tropical agriculture projects have provided 
nothing of value to the borrowing nation, while destroying or re-
placing successful subsistence agro-forestry systems practiced by 
indigenous peoples. 136 
Other kinds of development assistance that have not received 
enough attention from the MDBs include funding for microenter-
prises, population and family planning programs, and land reform 
schemes. Microenterprising, or "microlending," is the practice of 
extending small, short-term loans, typically from fifty dollars to 
several hundred dollars, to poor Third World entrepreneurs who 
would otherwise have no access to credit. 137 Several private devel-
opment organizations claim repayment rates approaching 100%, 
and tell of impoverished clients who used the loans to build suc-
cessful small busines~es.138 For example, Accion International is a 
Cambridge, Massachusetts-based non-profit international develop-
ment agency that boasts a microloan repayment rate of ninety-eight 
percent. 139 One Accion International client, Aaron Aguilar, was an 
unemployed Mexican factory worker who borrowed $100 to buy 
materials for making clay figurines in his back yard. 140 Mr. Aguilar 
and his wife obtained and repaid a total of five small loans over 
133 Rich, supra note 27, at 741. 
1341d. 
'" Id. at 692. 
130 See id. 
137 Brent Bowers, Third-World Debt That is Almost Always Paid in Full, WALL ST. j., June 7, 
1991, at B2. 
"8Id. Microenterprising has become more popular at some non-private development 
agencies as well. For example, the 1990 microenterprise budget at the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID) was estimated at $114 million. See id. 
1391d. 
14°ld. 
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SIX years and expanded their business to eighteen full-time 
employees. l41 
Another example comes from Cameroon, where a group of 
women used a $100 loan from the New York based microloan 
agency Trickle Up to breed and raise chickens and sell eggs. 142 This 
microenterprise was so successful that the women were able to open 
a second shop and expand into the tailoring business. 143 As these 
examples illustrate, microenterprise lending is attractive when com-
pared to large-scale project lending because it directly targets poor 
individuals in developing nations. Furthermore, microenterprise 
lending is a less risky alternative to large-scale project lending be-
cause one failed microenterprise will not adversely affect the inhab-
itants and environment of an entire region. 
V. U.S. INFLUENCE ON THE SIZE AND NATURE OF MDB 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
Although the MDBs are autonomous institutions, the United 
States can exert significant influence over MDB lending policies 
through its bank representatives. 144 The U.S. representatives to the 
MDBs can initiate discussions and make proposals at bank forums, 
and can consult with representatives from other countries.145 The 
U.S. representatives also are responsible for the largest MDB voting 
shares. 146 Thus, the U.S. government can command significant in-
fluence over the MDBs through its representatives. 
A. The Role of Congress in Shaping MDB Development Policy 
As independent, autonomous organizations, the MDBs are not 
officially controlled by the United States or any other govern-
ment. 147 Nevertheless, the United States exerts strong influence over 
the banks by virtue of its sizable voting share on the boards of 
directors and its status as the leading world financial and economic 
141 [d. In addition to Accion International, many of the larger and better known private 
development organizations, such as CARE and Save the Children, have undergone dramatic 
shifts towards increased microlending in recent years. [d. 
142 [d. 
145 [d. 
144 See Jonathan E. Sanford, U.S. Policy Toward the Multilateral Development Banks: The 
Role a/Congress, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1,20 (1988). 
145 See id. at 20-25. 
146 Rich, supra note 27, at 718-19. 
147 See SANFORD, supra note 17, at 3-8. 
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power. 148 Congress and the executive branch each play a role in 
determining V.S. policy toward the MDBs.149 
While several executive agencies participate in formulating V.S. 
policy toward the MDBs, the most important are the Treasury 
Department, th~ State Department, and the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID).150 The Treasury Department is respon-
sible for issuing instructions to the V.S. representatives at the 
MDBs.151 Congress, however, may pass legislation that obligates the 
Secretary of the Treasury to conform to congressional policies when 
giving instructions to the representatives. 152 
Although the executive agencies traditionally have exerted 
most of the control over day-to-day V.S. participation in the 
MDBs,153 Congress has recently expanded its role by influencing 
V.S. MDB policy through legislation and control of the purse.154 
For example, Congress has passed numerous laws that establish 
V.S. policy toward the MDBs and govern how V.S. MDB represen-
tatives shall participate and vote in bank forums. 155 This legislation 
may take the form of a general statement of V.S. MDB policy, a 
requirement that the Administration report to Congress on MDB 
activity in a partic1;llarly important area, or a directive for the V.S. 
representative to propose, advocate, or oppose certain bank activi-
ties that Congress deems desirable or undesirable. 156 
In addition, Congress has used the power of the purse to exert 
influence over MDB operations by increasing or decreasing V.S. 
contributions, rescinding past authorizations, earmarking V.S. 
funds for particular uses, blocking actual disbursement of funds, 
or simply by considering one of these alternatives. 157 The Vnited 
States has had some success at influencing policies at the banks 
148 Rich, supra note 27, at 71S. 
149 See Sanford, supra note 144, at 2-3. 
150 SANFORD, supra note 17, at 9-10. For a description of the interagency process, which 
brings together executive agencies with an interest in MDB affairs, see generally id. at S5-
lOS. 
151 Sanford, supra note 144, at 20. 
152 [d. 
153 SANFORD, supra note 17, at 109. 
154 Sanford, supra note 144, at 16-17. 
155 See Rich, supra note 27, at 722; Sanford, supra note 144, at 19-20. 
156 Sanford, supra note 144, at 20-25. 
157 See id. at 25. For a discussion of the implications of these appropriations tactics and 
how Congress has attempted to use them to influence MDB policies, see generally id. at 34-
62. 
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through the use of legislation and policy statements. 158 The follow-
ing subsection analyzes these attempts by Congress to influence 
MDB lending policies. 
B. Legislation Governing U.S. Policy on the Size and Nature of MDB 
Development Projects 
Among the laws passed by Congress that affect U.S. policy 
toward the MDBs are several that specifically address either the 
need for development aid to target the poor more directly, or the 
importance of promoting smaller-scale, less capital-intensive project 
lending. 159 Congress has enacted legislation that adopts as U.S. 
policy the "basic needs" approach to development. 16o This statute 
directs U.S. MDB representatives to be mindful of the extent to 
which a loan program directly benefits the poor in the debtor coun-
try. Representatives must then advocate and vote for those projects 
that address basic human needs. 161 In addition, the Secretary of the 
Treasury must consult with bank representatives of other countries 
for the purpose of adopting international guidelines specifying that 
some portion of MDB funds will be channeled to benefit the need-
iest people. 162 Congress also directs the Secretary of the Treasury 
to request the MDBs to prepare assessments of the extent to which 
their lending practices have benefitted the poor. 163 
To promote this focus on the needy, Congress passed legislation 
stating that it shall be U.S. policy to advocate the allocation of MDB 
agricultural aid funds to projects that are concerned with the debtor 
country's domestic food needs and the alleviation of hunger. 164 
Furthermore, this legislation obligates the Secretary of the Treasury 
to instruct the U.S. bank representatives to support MDB programs 
that are aimed at generating broad increases in income and em-
158 See, e.g., Rich, supra note 27, at 719; Sanford, supra note 144, at 62-63; Plater, supra 
note 38, at 206-07. 
159 For a synopsis of statutes that Congress has passed to gain influence over V.S. policy 
toward the MDBs, see Sanford, supra note 144, app. at 92-113. 
160 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 102, 22 V.S.C. § 2151-1(a) (1988). See generally 
STREETEN ET AL., supra note 62 (advocating the need to ensure that the basic needs of the 
poor are satisfied before resources are committed to other areas of development). 
161 International Financial Institutions Act § 701, 22 V.S.C. § 262d(b)(2) (1988). 
162 22 V.S.C. § 262g-2 (1988). 
163 22 V.S.C. § 2620(a)( 1) (1988). 
164 22 V.S.C. § 262g (1988). 
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ployment, especially among the rural poor. 165 The U.S. represen-
tatives also should support MDB activities that encourage debtor 
countries to diversify agriculturally and to avoid the economic risks 
of monoculture, such as debilitating price fluctuations. 166 In fact, 
congressional support for encouraging the MDBs to emphasize 
basic needs is so strong that Congress wrote a "basic needs" excep-
tion into the general U.S. policy opposing loans for countries that 
violate human rights or harbor hijackers. 167 
Moreover, federal legislation directs the U.S. MDB represen-
tatives to promote the use of appropriate light-capital technologies 
in MDB projects and to support funding increases for projects that 
incorporate such technologies. 168 Congress has identified the banks' 
reliance on inappropriate large-scale infrastructure projects as the 
major reason behind the lack of popular support for the MDBs in 
the United States}69 The Senate Appropriations Committee re-
cently cautioned: 
The MDB's do not enjoy a strong constituency among the Amer-
ican public, especially because of their record of funding large 
infrastructure projects which damage the environment and do 
little to address the root causes of underdevelopment. Unless 
the MDB's become much more responsive to the pressing global 
problems of poverty, environmental degradation, and uncon-
trolled population growth, the Committee's continued support 
for the MDB's cannot be taken for granted. 17O 
In addition, Congress passed legislation that attempts to steer 
the MDBs away from large-scale, capital-intensive lending by en-
couraging less intrusive projects. For example, in the context of 
debt reduction schemes, U.S. representatives, particularly those to 
the World Bank, are directed to promote sustainable economic 
development projects that are specifically tailored to a Third World 
country.l7l Congress also has sought to promote MDB development 
programs such as small-scale economic activities (microenterprises) 
for the poor,172 energy conservation in place of new energy proj-
165 22 u.s.c. § 262n-l (1988). For a discussion of how aid often fails to benefit the rural 
poor, see supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. 
166 22 u.s.c. § 262n-l (1988). 
167 22 U.S.C. § 262d(f) (1988). 
168 22 U.S.C. § 262f (1988). 
169 S. REP. No. 519, lOIst Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1990). 
170 [d. 
17122 U.S.C.A. § 2621(e) (West 1990). 
17222 U.S.C. § 262p-2 (1988). See generally Bowers, supra note 137, at B2 (discussing 
recent trends in microenterprising). 
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ects,173 and improved project procedures designed to inform all 
interested non-governmental organizations in the debtor country of 
any environmentally sensitive project. 174 
VI. EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT U.S. LEGISLATION AND 
ALTERNATIVES FOR FUTURE U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE MDBs 
The U.S. initiatives discussed above have achieved limited suc-
cess in persuading the MDBs to adopt revised lending policies re-
garding large-scale, capital-intensive projectsP5 What real changes 
the banks have undergone are likely attributable, at least in part, to 
congressional pressure}76 Professor Jonathan Sanford suggests, 
however, that the likelihood of success of a congressional initiative 
is simply a function of how compatible that initiative is with the 
MDBs' underlying rules and economic objectives. 177 The banks are 
envisioned as apolitical institutions, prohibited by their articles of 
agreement from interfering in internal affairs of borrower nations 
or basing lending decisions on any non-economic criteria. 178 
U.S. efforts to oppose MDB loans to countries that purchase 
sophisticated armaments or engage in drug trafficking or human 
rights violations, for example, may be considered political in nature 
and have had little effect on the amount of funding provided to 
those countriesp9 One failed U.S. effort involved attempts to dis-
courage the International Development Association from lending 
to India until that country changed its nuclear policies. 180 Con-
versely, arguments over how to structure bank projects to best al-
leviate poverty and promote development are economic issues that 
are the proper subject of debate under the banks' rules. Nonethe-
less, whether the MDBs now wish to fund less intrusive, more 
beneficial projects will come out in the project voting process and 
will ultimately depend on the banks' true lending objectives. 
175 22 U.S.C. § 2621 (1988). 
17422 U.S.C.A. § 262m-5(b)(5) (West 1990). 
175 See Rich, supra note 27, at 719; Sanford, supra note 144, at 62-63. 
176 See Sanford, supra note 144, at 63; Plater, supra note 38, at 206-07. 
177 Sanford, supra note 144, at 67-69. 
17. World Bank Articles of Agreement, supra note 19, art. IV, § 10; see also Sanford, supra 
note 144, at 69. 
179 Sanford, supra note 144, at 68. Sanford concludes that "most MDB member countries 
agree that these issues are serious, but consider them to be political or internal matters, and 
not primarily economic development issues." Id. at 69. In keeping with their articles of 
agreement, the banks generally prefer to avoid basing their decisions on anything other than 
economic criteria. Id. 
180 Sanford, supra note 144, at 68-69 & n.251. 
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As discussed above, much of the responsibility for large MDB 
development projects that fall short of expectations can be traced 
to the banks' failure to conduct meaningful cost-benefit analyses. I81 
Comprehensive social cost-benefit analyses that take full account of 
all non-monetary project impacts must accompany future MDB 
projects, especially large, risky schemes. I82 These analyses must ad-
dress the tendency for many economic costs associated with large 
projects to increase-and many benefits to decrease-over time. I83 
Moreover, the greater engineering and financial risks that typically 
accompany a large, high-technology project must be disclosed and 
accounted for. This may be accomplished by multiplying expected 
gross costs and benefits by the probability, based on the perfor-
mance of similar projects in the past, that such expectations will be 
achieved. 184 
Another problem that affects Congress' ability to influence the 
MDBs is the lack of access to bank information. I85 Because there 
are no requirements that the banks disclose internal documents, 
Congress must, to an extent, operate in the dark. Therefore, Con-
gress should insist that the MDBs provide comprehensive reports 
on major projects and loan programs. I86 This disclosure require-
ment would allow Congress to exercise its influence in a more 
meaningful manner. 
In addition, although the MDBs have finally realized that a 
variety of non-governmental organizations must participate in the 
development lending process, the banks are still wary of outside 
involvement. I87 The MDBs typically allow non-governmental orga-
nizations to play only a limited role. I88 Congress should reiterate its 
desire that the banks involve non-governmental organizations at a 
more fundamental level, especially during the project planning and 
appraisal stages. 
As discussed above, congressional legislation attempts to push 
the MDBs in the right direction-away from projects that are det-
rimental to the people of the host country. Much of this legislation, 
181 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
182 See MIKESELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 50-51. 
183 See id. at 51. 
184 [d. at 52. "Thus, if on the basis of experience with similar projects there is a 25 
percent probability that benefits will be only half those estimated in the feasibility study, 
projected benefits [for this project] should be reduced by at least 13 percent." [d. 
185 HELLINGER ET AL., supra note 50, at 151. 
186 [d. at 152. 
187 See Rich, supra note 36, at 49, 51. 
188 See id. 
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however, has been ineffective. 189 In the past, Congress has linked 
V.S. MDB contributions to bank policy reform. 190 If Congress is 
serious about the changes in MDB policy that are promoted by V.S. 
legislation, the Congressional Appropriations Committees must, on 
a regular basis, begin to link V.S. contributions directly to the banks' 
compliance with V.S. demands. 
Vsing V.S. MDB contributions in this manner has been criti-
cized by many, including V.S. administrations, as being too politi-
cal. 191 Nevertheless, in the words of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, V.S. MDB contributions "cannot be taken for 
granted."192 Because the banks want to continue to receive appro-
priations from their largest contributor, they will implement the 
policy changes that so many are calling for. If Congress is unwilling 
to use the power of the purse to influence the banks' stance on 
large-scale, capital-intensive projects, it must be content to watch 
the enormous V.S. MDB contributions fund "development" projects 
that set back borrower nations even further. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Despite fears that the use of V.S. MDB. contributions to influ-
ence bank policy will politicize the role of donor countries or violate 
the banks' autonomy, Congress must tie future support to reforms 
in the MDB lending process. Congress should not earmark V.S. 
funds for particular projects or seek greater control over bank 
decision making. If, however, the MDBs continue to finance debil-
itating projects in the Third World, the enormous V.S. commitment 
might be more effective if contributed through AID and private 
development agencies such as CARE and Accion International. 
Congressional directives obligating the V.S. MDB representatives 
to cast their votes according to V.S. development policy already 
have inspired some change at the banks. By using the power of the 
purse, Congress can motivate needed changes in MDB policies re-
garding inappropriate and destructive large-scale development 
projects. 
John M. Updegraph, III 
189 See, e.g., lain Guest, The World Bank is Goingfor the Green, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1991, 
at C3. The World Bank is presently funding a massive hydroelectric project in Thailand that 
may cause many economic, social, and environmental problems. Id. 
190 S. REP. No. 443, supra note 18, at 31. The Report states that "[o]ne of the reasons 
the [Senate Appropriations] Committee has reduced funding for the MDB's is due to the 
banks' failure to address the specific criticisms this Committee has made." Id. 
191 See Sanford, supra note 144, at 69-70 & n.255. 
192 S. REP. No. 519, supra note 169, at 45. 

